Budget Points of Order

A “point of order” is a procedural objection that a Representative or Senator may raise against a bill, resolution, amendment, or conference report on the House or Senate Floor, respectively. In general, if the Presiding Office, advised by the Parliamentarian, sustains the point of order (i.e., finds it to be a valid objection), the offending bill, resolution, amendment, or conference report “falls” (i.e., it is removed from consideration by the House or Senate).

The principal exception is a “Byrd Rule” point of order, explained in § 4.11, where the offending provision of a budget reconciliation bill is automatically stricken from the measure.[1]

The only other point of order that strikes an offending provision relates to emergency spending designations.[2]

Points of order typically state that “it shall not be in order” for the House or Senate to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report that is inconsistent with a particular budgetary limitation or requirement.

Points of order can be waived. In the House of Representatives, waivers most often occur as part of “special rules,” adopted by the House, which set forth the procedural conditions under which particular legislation will be considered. Budget waivers in the House may apply to one or more specified points of order, or may include a blanket waiver of all budgetary points of order.

In the Senate, points of order may be waived by either a simple majority, or a supermajority pursuant to subsections 904(b) and (c) of the 1974 Budget Act, as amended.[3] Supermajorities of three-fifths of the Members of the Senate “duly chosen and sworn” are required to waive certain points of order (or to overturn a ruling of the Chair) in order to strengthen certain budgetary requirements. The supermajority requirements are indicated in Table 16 below by the “60 votes” designations. The 60 vote requirements are either permanent, or temporary with a current expiration date of September 30, 2025, as indicated in the table below by an asterisk.[4]

Most points of order are set forth in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,[5] as amended. Others are set forth in the Balanced Budget and Emergence Deficit Control Act of 1985 as amended, the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, the Rules of the House of Representatives or Senate, or in budget resolutions (see Table A-4). For example, the FY 2022 budget resolution includes points of order relating to advance appropriations in the House and advance appropriations in the Senate.

In the following table:

“leg.” = bills, resolutions, motions, amendments, and conference reports;
“BR” = budget resolution // “BA” = Budget Authority // “OT” = outlays.
“1974 CBA” = Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended
“PAYGO” = Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010
“1990 BEA” = Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

*Asterisk indicates the Senate 60-vote waiver requirement is temporary, with a current expiration date of Sept. 30, 2025.

Table: Budget Points of Order in the House and Senate

Point of Order Section and
USC citation

Description

HSE

SEN
Senate Waiver
Threshold
474[6]
[1] Points of Order Related to Timing
§ 303(a)

1974 CBA

2 USC 634(a)

Adoption of Budget Resolution Before Consideration of Budget-Related Legislation in the House:  In the House, prohibits consideration of leg. that provides new BA, an increase or decrease in revenues, or an increase or decrease in the debt limit in the budget year, until a BR has been agreed to. Exceptions—does not apply to advance appropriations, any appropriations in the House after May 15, or revenue changes after the budget year. X n/a
§ 303(a)

1974 CBA

2 USC 634(a)

Adoption of Budget Resolution Before Consideration of Budget-Related Legislation in the Senate: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of leg. that provides new BA, new entitlement authority, an increase or decrease in outlays, an increase or decrease in revenues, or an increase or decrease in the debt limit, until a BR has been agreed to, except for advance appropriations. X Simple Majority
§ 309

1974 CBA
2 USC 640

No House Adjournment in July Before Completion of Appropriations: In the House, prohibits adjourning for more than 3 days during July until the House has approved all regular appropriations bills. X n/a
§ 310(f)

1974 CBA
2 USC 641

No House Adjournment in July Before Completion of Reconciliation: In the House, prohibits adjourning for more than 3 days during July until the House has completed action on reconciliation in years when the budget resolution includes instructions. X n/a
[2] Points of Order Related to Consideration of the Budget Resolution
§ 301(g)
1974 CBA
2 USC 632(g)
Senate Prohibition of Multiple Economic Assumptions: In the Senate, prohibits more than one set of economic and technical assumptions in a budget resolution. X Simple Majority
§ 305(b)(2)

1974 CBA
2 USC 636(b)(2)

Senate Germaneness Requirement for Amendments to BR: Prohibits consideration of nongermane amendments to Budget Resolution. In general, an amendment is germane only if it strikes a provision, changes a number, limits an existing provision, or expresses the “sense of the Senate.” X 60 votes
§ 305(c)(4)

1974 CBA
2 USC 636(c)(4)

Senate Germaneness Requirement for Amendments Between the Houses: Prohibits consideration of nongermane amendments to BR “amendments in disagreement” between the House and Senate. X 60 votes
§ 305(d)

1974 CBA
2 USC 636(d)

Senate Mathematical Consistency Requirement: Prohibits a vote on a BR unless the figures contained in the resolution are mathematically consistent. X Simple Majority
§ 305(a)(4)
1974 CBA
2 USC 636(a)(4)
Amendments to Budget Resolution Related to Economic Goals: Sets for requirements for consideration of amendments to a budget resolution relating to certain economic goals under the Full Employment Act of 1946 (as described in sections 1022(a)(2) and 1022a(b) of title 15). X   n/a
[3] Points of Order Related to Spending Legislation in General
§ 311(a)

1974 CBA
2 USC 642(a)

Prohibition on Spending Leg. Exceeding Budget Resolution Aggregates: Prohibits consideration of spending leg. by the House or Senate, after a BR has been agreed to, that would cause the BR’s aggregate spending levels for BA or OT to be exceeded for the budget year. Exceptions in the House: Declaration of War and hold harmless for appropriation bills that comply with 302(a) allocation. X X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 302(f)(1)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(f)

House—Enforcing Committee and Subcommittee BA Allocations:  Prohibits consideration in the House of Approps. leg. that would cause appropriations committee or subcommittee BA allocations for the budget year to be exceeded, or direct spending leg. that would cause an authorizing committee’s BA allocation for the budget year or the total of covered years in the budget resolution to be exceeded. X n/a
§ 302(f)(2(B)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(f)

Senate–Enforcing BA and Outlay Allocations and Suballocations:
Prohibits consideration in the Senate of Approps. leg. that would cause an Approps. subcommittee’s BA or Outlay allocation for the budget year to be exceeded, or direct spending leg. that would cause an authorizing committee’s BA or outlay allocation for the budget year or the total of covered years in the budget resolution to be exceeded.
X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
[4] Points of Order Related to Discretionary Spending
§ 302(c)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(c)

Suballocations Before Appropriation Bills: After the Appropriations Committee has received its 302(a) allocations of BA and OT for the budget year, it is not in order for the House or Senate to consider an appropriations bill until the Committee makes its 302(b) suballocations. X X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 302(f)(1)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(f)

House—Budget Authority Must Remain Within Allocated Levels:  Prohibits consideration in the House of Approps. leg. that would cause appropriations full committee or subcommittee BA allocations for the budget year to be exceeded. X n/a
§ 302(f)(2)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(f)

Senate—Budget Authority and Outlays Must Remain Within Allocated Levels: Prohibits consideration in the Senate of Approps. leg. that would cause an appropriations subcommittee’s BA or Outlay allocation for the budget year to be exceeded. X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 303(c)
1974 CBA
2 USC 634(c)
Senate–No Appropriations Before Budget: Prohibits consideration in the Senate of any appropriations legislation until a budget has been agreed to and an allocation to the Appropriations Committee has been made. (Exception: advance appropriations.) X Simple majority
§ 312(b)

1974 CBA
2 USC 643(b)

Exceeding Spending Caps in the Senate: In the Senate, prohibits the consideration of legislation that would cause any discretionary spending limits to be exceeded including the caps established in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (except when a declaration of war or recession waiver is in effect). X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 314

FY 2009 BR
S.Con.Res.70

 

Striking Changes in Mandatory Programs (CHIMPS) in Appropriations in the Senate: Permits any Senator to strike a CHIMP in an appropriations measure if the following conditions are met: (1) the CHIMP would increase BA in at least 1 of the 9 years after the budget year and over the 10-year budget window; (2) the CHIMP would increase net outlays over the 9 years following the budget year; and (3) the sum of all CHIMPs in the measure would increase net outlays over the 9 years after the budget year. However, provisions enacted in each of the 3 years prior to the budget year are exempted. X 60 votes
§§ 4002-03 of
FY 2022 BR
S.Con.Res. 14
Limits on Advance Appropriations: Recent budget resolutions [see Table A-4] have included points of order, in the House and Senate, against advance appropriations.[7] unless specifically permitted in the budget resolution or Joint Statement of Managers. It is advisable to check each budget resolution (or deeming resolution) for these points of order (and exceptions) when reviewing bills and amendments for potential procedural issues. (The citation in the left column is an example in the budget resolution for FY 2022). X X 60 votes
House Rule XXI, cl. 2 (118th Cong.) Prohibiting Net Spending Increases in Appropriations: Prohibits amendments to appropriations that would increase net budget authority. X n/a
H.Res. 5 § 3(f) 118th Cong.) Appropriations Must Contain Spending Reduction Lock-Box Account: Prohibits consideration of appropriations bills unless they contain a spending reduction account that would make spending cuts resulting from amendments unavailable as budgetary offsets for subsequent amendments. X n/a
H.Res. 5  § 3(aa)    (118th Cong.) Automatic Reduction for Unauthorized Appropriations: In the 1st session of the 118th Congress, this point of order would trigger an automatic reduction to the prior year’s level for an appropriations account not authorized by law. X n/a
§ 314(e)

1974 CBA

2 USC 645(e)

60-vote Threshold in the Senate for Emergency Designations: This subsection effectively requires a 60-vote requirement for “emergency” designations that exempt such spending from the statutory caps. [No longer has a practical impact on appropriations with expiration of the BCA statutory caps at the end of FY’21.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 314(f)

1974 CBA
2 USC 645(f)

Enforcement of Discretionary Spending Caps: Prohibits consideration in the House or Senate of leg. that would cause discretionary spending limits to be exceeded. [No longer effective with expiration of the BCA spending caps at the end of FY’21) X X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
[5] Points of Order Relating to Direct (Mandatory) Spending
§ 302(f)(1)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(f)

Budget Authority Must Remain Within Allocated Levels in the House:  Prohibits consideration in the House of direct spending leg. that would cause an authorizing committee’s BA allocation for the budget year or the total of covered years in the budget resolution to be exceeded. X n/a
§ 302(f)(2)(A)

1974 CBA

2  USC 633(f)

Budget Authority and Outlays Must Remain Within Allocated Levels in the Senate: Prohibits consideration in the Senate of direct spending leg. that would cause an authorizing committee’s BA or outlay allocation for the budget year or the total of covered years in the budget resolution to be exceeded. X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
Hse Rule XXI, cl. 10 118th Cong. House CUTGO Rule: Prohibits consideration of legislation in the House that would increase net direct spending for either the 6-year or 11-year period beginning with the current fiscal year. X n/a
§ 4106

FY 2018 BR
(H.Con.Res. 71,
115th Cong.)

Senate PAYGO Rule:  Prohibits consideration in the Senate of any direct spending or revenue legislation that would increase the on-budget deficit in: (1) the current year; (2) the budget year; (3) the 6-year period beginning with the current fiscal year; or (4) the 11-year period beginning with the current year. X 60 votes
§ 4(g)(3)
STATUTORY
PAYGO
60-vote Threshold in the Senate for Emergency Designations: In the Senate, if a point of order is raised against an emergency designation in direct spending or revenue legislation, the provision making the designation must be stricken, unless the point of order is waived by a supermajority. X 60 votes
§ 401(a)
1974 CBA
2 USC 651(a)
No New Budget Authority Not Subject to Appropriations:  Prohibits consideration in the House or Senate of legislation that would provide new budget authority to enter into contracts (contract authority), new authority to incur indebtedness (borrowing authority480[8]), or new authority to provide loans or loan guarantees (credit authority) unless the new budget authority is effective only to the extent or in the amounts provided in advance in appropriation acts. X X Simple majority
§ 401(b)(1)

1974 CBA
2 USC 651(b)

Prohibition of New Entitlement Authority in Current Year: Prohibits consideration of  any new entitlement leg. in the Senate, or reported entitlement leg. in the House, which is to become effective during the current fiscal year (i.e., before the new budget resolution). (This prohibition has little impact in the Senate since it can be waived by a simple majority.) X X Simple Majority
§ 3205(a)

FY 2016 BR
S.Con.Res. 11

Cost Estimates Required for Direct Spending Legislation: In the Senate, prohibits voting on passage of any matter that requires a cost estimate under Section 402 of the 1974 Budget Act (i.e., measures reported by a committee other than the Appropriations Committee), unless that cost estimate was made publicly available not later than 28 hours before a vote. X 60 votes
H.Res. 5 § 3(e) (118th Congress) Long-Term Spending [the “4-10s”]: In the House, prohibits consideration of legislation that would cause a net increase in direct spending in excess of $2.5 billion in any of the four 10-year periods beyond the current 10-year window. X n/a
[6] Points of Order Related to Revenue Legislation
§ 303(a)

1974 CBA

2 USC 634(a)

No Revenue Legislation in the House before Adoption of BR:  In the House, prohibits consideration of leg. that provides new BA, an increase or decrease in revenues, or an increase or decrease in the debt limit in the budget year, until a BR has been agreed to. Exceptions—does not apply to advance appropriations, any appropriations in the House after May 15, or revenue changes after the budget year. X n/a
§ 303(a)

1974 CBA

2 USC 634(a)

No Revenue Legislation in the Senate before Adoption of BR: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of leg. that provides new BA, new entitlement authority, an increase or decrease in outlays, an increase or decrease in revenues, or an increase or decrease in the debt limit, until a BR has been agreed to, except for advance appropriations. X Simple Majority
§ 311(a)

1974 CBA
2 USC 642

Enforcing the Revenue Floor: Prohibits consideration of revenue leg. by the House or Senate that would reduce revenues below the BR’s revenue floors for the budget year, or the total for all years covered by the BR (exception in the House when a declaration of war is in effect). X X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 4106

FY 2018 BR
(H.Con.Res. 71,
115th Cong.)

Senate PAYGO Rule: Prohibits consideration in the Senate of direct spending or revenue legislation that would increase the on-budget deficit in: (1) the current year; (2) the budget year; (3) the 6-year period beginning with the current fiscal year; or (4) the 11-year period beginning with the current yr. X 60 votes
House Rules XXI, cl. 5(b) (118th Cong.) Supermajority to increase income tax rates: Requires a three-fifths majority in the House to approve legislation increasing federal income tax rates. X n/a
§ 4(g)(3)
STATUTORY
PAYGO
60-vote Threshold in the Senate for Emergency Designations: In the Senate, if a point of order is raised against an emergency designation in direct spending or revenue legislation, the provision making the designation must be stricken, unless the point of order is waived by a supermajority. X 60 votes
[7] Points of Order Related to Consideration of Reconciliation Legislation
§ 310(d)(1)

1974 CBA 2 USC 641(d)(1)

House Deficit Neutrality Requirement for Amendments to Reconciliation: Prohibits consideration of amendments to reconciliation that would increase the deficit or reduce the surplus either by increasing outlays or reducing revenues., except that: a motion to strike new budget or entitlement authority is always in order, the Rules Committee can make in order amendments to bring committees into compliance with their instructions, and the requirement is waived when a declaration of war is in effect. X n/a
§ 310(d)(2)

1974 CBA 2 USC 641(d)(2)

Senate Prohibition of Amendments Leading to Noncompliance: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of amendments to reconciliation legislation that, on net, would increase the deficit relative to the applicable reconciliation instructions, except that a motion to strike is always in order and the requirement is waived when a declaration of war is in effect. X 60 votes
§ 310(e)
1974 CBA
2 USC 641(e)
Senate Germaneness Requirement for Amendments to Reconciliation: Prohibits consideration of nongermane amendments to reconciliation bills, incorporating by reference the 305(b)(2) procedures for budget resolutions. In general, an amendment is germane only if it strikes a provision, changes a number, limits an existing provision in the bill, or expresses the “sense of the Senate.” X 60 votes
§ 313

1974 CBA “Byrd Rule”

2 USC 644

Byrd Rule Prohibition against Non-Budgetary and other Extraneous Provisions in Senate Reconciliation Legislation: Prohibits consideration of “extraneous,” i.e., non-budgetary leg., or leg. causing outyear deficit increases or outside a committee’s jurisdiction in a reconciliation bill. Offending provisions are stripped out of the reconciliation bill if the point of order is sustained. For a detailed explanation of provisions considered to be “extraneous” see Table 4-2, the Byrd Rule 4-part test. X 60 votes
§ 310(g)

1974 CBA
2 USC 641

No Reconciliation Provisions Impacting Social Security: Prohibits consideration of reconciliation bills, amendments, or conference reports that contain “recommendations with respect to Social Security (OASDI).” X X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
House Rule XXI, cl. 7 (118th Cong.) No Spending Increases in Budget Reconciliation: Prohibits a Budget Resolution containing Reconciliation Instructions that would increase net direct spending. X n/a
[8] Points of Order Related to Deficit and Debt Increases
§ 404(a)
FY 2010 BR
S.Con.Res.13
Short-Term Deficits: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of legislation (except appropriations bills) that would cause a net increase in the deficit in excess of $10 billion in any year in the 10-year budget window unless the legislation is fully offset over the same period. X 60 votes
§ 3101(b)(1)
FY 2016 BR
S.Con.Res. 11 (114th Congress)
Long-Term Deficits [the “4-10s”]: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of legislation that would cause a net increase in the on-budget deficit in excess of $5 billion in any of the four 10-year periods beyond the current window. X 60 votes
§ 312(c)

1974 CBA
2 USC 643(c)

Prohibits BR Exceeding Maximum Deficit Amounts in the Senate: In the Senate, prohibits the consideration of a BR that would breach a maximum deficit amount as set forth in BBEDCA, if any (except when declaration of war or a recession waiver is in effect). [No longer effective since maximum deficit amounts expired.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
[9] Points of Order Related to Federal Credit
§ 504(b)

1974 CBA
2 USC 661c(b)

Requires Advance Appropriations for Credit Legislation (with Exceptions): Requires that new direct loan obligations and new loan guarantees may be incurred only to the extent that new budget authority to cover their costs is provided in advance in an appropriations act. Does not apply to entitlements such as student loans or veterans’ home loans, or agriculture loans under the CCC. X X Simple majority
§ 401(a)
1974 CBA
2 USC 651(a)
No New Budget Authority Not Subject to Appropriations:  Prohibits consideration in the House or Senate of legislation that would provide new budget authority to enter into contracts (contract authority), new authority to incur indebtedness (borrowing authority), or new authority to provide loans or loan guarantees (credit authority) unless the new budget authority is effective only to the extent or in the amounts provided in advance in appropriation acts. X X Simple majority
[10] Points of Order Related to Social Security
§ 301(i)

1974 CBA
2 USC 632

No BRs that Decrease Social Security Surplus: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of a BR that would decrease the Social Security surplus in any of the years covered by the Resolution. (This is an anachronism because Social Security has been running annual deficits since calendar year 2010.483F[9]) X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 310(g)

1974 CBA
2 USC 641

No Reconciliation Provisions Impacting Social Security: Prohibits consideration of reconciliation bills, amendments, or conference reports that contain “recommendations with respect to Social Security (OASDI).” X X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 311(a)(3)

1974 CBA
2 USC 642

No Senate Legislation that Would Worsen Social Security Position: In the Senate, prohibits consideration of leg. that would cause a decrease in Social Security surpluses or an increase in Social Security deficits in the first fiscal year or the total of all fiscal years covered by the BR. X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 3301(a)

FY 2016 BR
S.Con.Res. 11

No House Legislation that Would Worsen Social Security Position: In the House, prohibits consideration of legislation that would reduce the actuarial balance of the present value of future taxable payroll by at least 0.01% of the federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund for the 75-year period utilized in the most recent report of the Board of Trustees. X n/a
§ 13302(a)

1990 BEA
2 USC 632 note

Protection of Social Security Trust Funds in the House: Prohibits consideration of legislation in the House that would provide for a net increase in Social Security benefits or decrease in Social Security taxes in excess of 0.02% of the present value of future taxable payroll for a 75-year period, or in excess of $250,000,000 for the first five-year period after it becomes effective. X n/a
§ 13
S-PAYGO
2 USC 939
Protection of Social Security from Any Legislation Impacting OASDI or Payroll Taxes:  In effect sets up a 60 vote threshold in the Senate to consider any Social Security reform legislation. X X 60 votes
[11] Point of Order Related to Jurisdiction
§ 306

1974 CBA
2 USC 637

Budget Legislation Must be Handled by Budget Committee: Prohibits consideration of matters within the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee if the matter has not been reported by that committee or if that committee has not been discharged from consideration of the matter. X X 60 votes
[12] Points of Order Related to Unfunded Mandates
§ 425(a)(1)

1974 CBA
2 USC 658d(a)(1)

Prohibits Consideration of Legislation unless Committee has published CBO statement on Unfunded Mandates: Prohibits consideration of any committee-reported legislation unless a CBO statement on intergovernmental or private sector mandates has been published by the Committee. (Supermajority repealed in S.Con.Res. 5, 117th Cong.) X X Simple majority
§ 425(a)(2)

1974 CBA
2 USC 658d(a)(2)

Prohibits Legislation that that would Increase Intergovernmental Mandates in Excess of the Threshold Unless the Costs are Covered by Direct Spending or Authorization of Appropriations: Prohibits consideration of legislation that would increase the direct costs of intergovernmental mandates by an amount greater than the inflation-adjusted threshold (for FY 2023, $99 million for intergovernmental mandates) unless the legislation provides direct spending authority for each fiscal year or authorizes appropriations sufficient to cover those costs. An authorization of an appropriation will not be sufficient unless the authorized amounts are specified for each year (up to 10 years) and the legislation provides a way to terminate or scale back the mandate if the federal agency determines that the appropriated funds are not sufficient to cover those costs.485F[10] (Supermajority repealed in S.Con.Res. 5, 117th Cong.) X X Simple majority
§ 426, CBA
2 USC 658e
Prohibits Special Rules in the House that include waivers of § 425, and lays out special procedures to debate and consider a waiver in the House. X n/a
[13] Disclosure Requirements for Earmarks
House Rule XXI, clause 9
118th Congress
House Earmark Disclosure Rule: Requires disclosure of earmark sponsors, as well as justifications for earmarks, and written certification that earmarks will not benefit their House sponsor. X n/a
Sen Rule XLIV Senate Earmark Disclosure Rule: An earmark is defined as “a congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit.” Rule 44 prohibits consideration of leg. unless the committee chair or majority leader certifies that all earmarks in legislative or report language have been identified by sponsor and are publicly available on the Internet for 48 hours. Senators must provide to the committee the name and location of the earmark beneficiary, and they must certify no financial interest. Prohibits “air-dropping,” i.e., inserting new earmarks into conference reports. X 60 votes
[14] Point of Order Related to Emergency Requirements
314(e), CBA
2 USC 645(e)
Senate Point of Order Against Emergency Designations: Point of order in the Senate causes emergency designations to be stricken, absent 60 votes for a waiver. (This is less significant w/ expiration of the BCA spending caps.) X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
§ 4001 of S.Con.Res. 14, 117th Cong. [pertains to scoring for purposes of the 302 and 311 points of order]
Emergency provisions are exempted for purposes of enforcing: sections 302 and 311 of the Budget Act (committee allocations and aggregate spending and revenue levels, respectively); section 3101 of S. Con. Res. 11 (114th Congress) re: long-term deficits; and section 4106 of H. Con. Res. 71 (115th Congress) setting forth the Senate PAYGO rule.
X
[15] Points of Order under BBEDCA, as amended[11]
258(a)(4)(C)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907a(a)(4)(C)
60-vote Threshold to Amend Resolution Suspending MDA Sequester and Budget Resolution Due to Low Growth: In the Senate, a point of order lies against amendments to a joint resolution suspending maximum deficit amount sequestration and enforcement of BR aggregates and committee allocations, due to a finding of low growth. [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
258A(b)(3)(C)(i)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907b(b)(3)(C)(i)
Floor Amendments Modifying the MDA Sequester Must be Germane:
In the Senate, a point of order lies against amendments to a joint resolution modifying a presidential sequestration order triggered by violation of maximum deficit amounts. [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.]
X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
258B(f)(1)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907c(f)(1)
Committee Amendments Modifying Defense Flexibility Must be Germane or Relevant: In the Senate, a point of order lies against amendments proposed in the Committee on Appropriations (other than germane or relevant amendments) to a joint resolution exercising flexibility among defense programs, projects, and activities in a sequestration order triggered by violation of maximum deficit amounts. [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
258B(h)(1)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907c(h)(1)
Floor Amendments Modifying Defense Flexibility Must be Germane or Relevant: In the Senate, a point of order lies against any Floor amendment to a joint resolution exercising flexibility among defense programs, projects, and activities in a sequestration order triggered by violation of maximum deficit amounts, unless such amendment is germane or relevant. [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
258B(h)(3)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907c(h)(3)
Amendment Exercising Defense Flexibility Must be Outlay Neutral: In the Senate, point of order lies against any Floor amendment to a joint resolution exercising flexibility among defense programs, projects, and activities in a sequestration order triggered by violation of maximum deficit amounts. unless such amendment is outlay-neutral [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
258C(a)(5)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907d(a)(5)
60-vote Threshold for a Bill, Resolution or Amendment modifying an MDA Sequester if MDA Would Be Exceeded: In the Senate, point of order lies against any special reconciliation bill or resolution (or amendment) to replace a presidential sequester order triggered by violation of maximum deficit amounts if such bill or resolution would cause maximum deficit amounts to be exceeded. [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
258C(b)(1)
BBEDCA
2 USC 907d(b)(1)
Reconciliation Procedural Requirements Apply to Sequester Replacement Bill: In the Senate, points of order normally applying to consideration of Reconciliation bills also apply to special reconciliation bill or resolution to replace a presidential sequester order triggered by violation of maximum deficit amounts. [Maximum deficit amounts are no longer in effect.] X 60 votes*
(exp. 9/30/25)
*Asterisk indicates the Senate 60-vote waiver requirement is temporary, with a current expiration date of Sept. 30, 2025.

[1] The “Byrd Rule” is set forth in Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended, § 313, 2 U.S.C. § 644.

[2] (Section 403(e)(1) of S. Con. Res. 13 (111th Congress); Section 314(e) of the 1974 Budget Act; and Section 4(g)(3) of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010.

[3] 2 USC §§ 621 note.

[4] The Senate supermajority (three-fifths) requirement for certain budget waivers (and related appeals) was established in 1985 by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 271(b), 99 Stat. 1037, 1096, as amended by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, §  210, 101 Stat. 754, 787, and was applied to additional points of order on a temporary basis by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10119, 111 Stat. 251, 695, with several extensions via budget resolution in fiscal years 1996, 2004, 2008, and 2016. The temporary requirements are currently scheduled to expire at the end of FY 2025.

[5] The Congressional 1974 Budget Act (Titles I-IX of Pub. L. No. 93-344) has been amended several times since its enactment by: the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-177; the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (Pub. L. No. 100-119); the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508); Title XIV of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-66 ); Title X of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Pub. L. No. 105-33); and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (Pub. L. No. 113-67).

[6] The Senate supermajority (three-fifths) requirement for certain budget waivers (and related appeals) was first established in 1985 by § 271(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended by § 210 of the 1987 Reaffirmation Act, and was applied to additional points of order on a temporary basis by § 10119 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 USC § 621 note with several extensions via budget resolution in fiscal years 1996, 2004, 2008, and 2016 (see Table A-4 for the extension provisions).

[7] Budget authority provided in an appropriation act that becomes available one or more fiscal years after the fiscal year for which the appropriation act was enacted.

[8] Other than indebtedness incurred under chapter 31 of title 31.

[9] Cong. Budget Off., CBO’s 2021 Long-Term Projections for Social Security: Additional Information,  Table A-1 (Jul. 8, 2021).

[10] See also CBO description of this enforcement mechanism at: https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51335#section3.

[11] The following points of order were enacted in BBEDCA to enforce maximum deficit amounts (which are no longer in effect).